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ployment benefit has an adverse effect on wages. 
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1  Motivation 
Theory predicts that a lower unemployment benefit (UB) decreases the (reservation) wages 
[see Rodgerson et al. (2005)]. Empirical literature supports this prediction. There are two 
ways to examine this UB effect. The first is to measure the impact of UB on reservation 
wages using survey data [see Feldstein and Poterba (1984) or Addison et al. (2009)]. The 
second  is  to  measure  the  impact  of  UB  on  wages  [see  Topel  (1984)  or  McCall  and  Chi 
(2008)]. Theory allows conclusions to be drawn about the impact of UB on wages and the 
impact of UB on reservation wages. We contribute to the literature on the effect of UB on 
wages.  To  do  so,  we  use  the  natural  experiment  of  the  labor  market  reform  of  2005  in 
Germany. 
The empirical measurement of this effect demands an exogenous variation of the UB. A good 
approach is a natural experiment in which the UB varies. The labor market reform of 2005 in 
Germany satisfies this condition. While other concerns exist, the three main issues of this 
reform are the following: (1) the flexibility of the labor market (e.g., temporary employment), 
(2) the introduction of top-up benefits and (3) the substantial decrease in long-term UB [see 
Jacobi and Kluve (2006)].
1 Before the 2005 reform, the UB was a fraction of the individual’s 
earnings. Since 2005, however, the long-term UB is fixed and non-income-related. We use the 
German BA-Employment Panel (2008) to show a negative effect of a reduced long-term UB 
on wages. We argue that this negative effect is driven by a decrease in the reservation wage.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 
describes the theoretic foundation and our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our results. 
Section 5 concludes this study. 
 
                                                           
1 The top-up benefit should ease the re-employment of long-term unemployed via wage subsidy. 3 
 
2  Dataset 
We use the BA-Employment Panel (2008), which consists of 2 percent of all employees with 
social security in Germany. This dataset contains quarterly individual information (e.g., sex, 
age, wage, employment status, education, type of employment) and firm-specific information 
(e.g.,  firm  size,  proportion  of  old  (>55)  and  young  (<20)  employees,  economic  sector) 
between the first quarter 1998 and the last quarter 2007. To ensure a balanced panel, we use 
the  BA-Employment  Panel  (2008)  from  the  year  2000  forward.
2 We  focus  on  full-time 
employees. Because of structural differences in the labor market, we divide the dataset into 
east and west Germany [see Kronthaler (2003) or Smolny (2009)]. We truncate the wages at 
one euro below the maximum level up to which contributions to the social insurance that have 
to be paid as incomes above this level are only reported voluntarily. We also truncate wages at 
a lower bound to exclude workers who receive top-up benefits.
3 We truncate at the level of 
650 euro because this is the average need of a long-term unemployed person in 2008 [Federal 
Statistical Office Germany (2010a)]. To use more control variables, we extended the BA-
Employment Panel (2008) with the industrial-specific gross value added (real annual value, 
base year: 2000) [Federal Statistical Office Germany (2010b)]. The empirical test of a search 
model implies the need for additional information with respect to labor market conditions. 
Therefore,  for  different  industries,  we  calculate  the  share  of  workers  who  become 
unemployed (lay-off risk). We seasonally adjust the lay-off risk.
4 Additionally, we calculate 
the job tenure as a proxy for the working experience. To avoid a time trend of the dependent 
variable, we calculated the real wages using inflation data of the Federal Statistical Office 
                                                           
2 Before the year 2000, it is not possible to follow people through unemployment quarters. 
3 Top-up benefits are paid additionally to low incomes.  
4 We also calculate the probabilities of getting a job (out of unemployment and employment). Those rates are 
strongly correlated with the lay-off risk in our sample. Therefore, only one rate can be used as an exogenous 
variable. 4 
 
(2011). The real wages between 2000 and 2007 were stationary.
5 We then divided our dataset 
into  different  industries  according  to  the  European  national  accounts  system  [see  Federal 
Statistical Office Germany (2007)].
6 
 
3  Methodology 
Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the UB has a positive impact on the reservation 
wage and, therefore, an indirect, positive impact on the wage. To identify this impact, we use 
a search model with exogenous job destruction and job matching. Workers are rational, utility 
maximizing  and  risk  averse.  Firms  maximize  their  profits.  The  wage  equation  of  such  a 
framework can be written as [see Rodgerson et al. (2005]: 
     1                   .        (1) 
The wage depends on the reservation wage   , the firms’ marginal revenues of an occupied 
post   and the revenue of a vacancy   . The bargaining power of employees is given by 
     0,1 . Equation (1) shows the direct link between the wage and the reservation wage. The 
general reservation wage is as follows: 
                      
      
                
∞
     .    (2) 
The reservation wage is determined by the UB, the rate of finding a job out of unemployment 
is    and  employment   ,  the  lay-off  risk  is  ,  the  discount  factor  is   and  the  wage 
distribution in the economy is F (w). Combining equations (1) and (2) delivers: 
                                                           
5Because we observe a fixed number of time periods, we applied the Harris-Tzavalis test for stationarity on 
every subgroup [Harris and Tzavalis (1999)]. The non-stationarity hypothesis is only not discarded for low-and 
high-skilled women in East and West Germany in the Construction Industry. These two groups are too small to 
derive reliable test results. 
6 We exclude inter-industrial mobility of workers because theory and empirics [e.g., Neal (1995)] argue that this 
mobility is not that important for employees. 5 
 
     1              ,  ,  , , ,  ,    ,  .    (3) 
The real wage depends positively ceteris paribus on the UB. The function G includes the other 
relevant parameters. The effect of UB on wage is positive. From equation (3), it is easy to 
derive an empirical model, as follows: 
                                 .      (4) 
The  real  wage   of  each  individual   in  period   is  estimated  via  a  constant,  the  UB,  the 
controls and an error term. To measure the effect of a reduction of the UB, we use a dummy 
variable that becomes unity from 2005 forward. This dummy covers the substantial decline of 
the outside option (long-term UB) for the worker. The parameter    describes the impact of a 
lower  long-term  UB  on  wages  from  2005  forward  as  a  consequence  of  the  labor  market 
reform. To isolate the effect of the UB reduction, we use common control variables. These are 
age, professional status, firm-size, firm’s age structure, industrial-specific gross value added 
per  worker,  individual  job  tenure,  industrial  specific  lay-off-risk  and  quarter  dummies  to 
control for seasonal effects. We run individual fixed effect regressions for three skill levels, 
for males and  for females.
7 An individual without vocational training is classified as low 
skilled. For a medium skill level, a completed vocational training is necessary and a higher 
academic  degree  is  the  criterion  for  high  skilled.  We  do  so  for  six  different  industries 
(building, manufacturing, retail, real estate, renting and business activitiess, transport, storage 
and communication, financial) in east and west Germany. To draw a detailed picture while 




                                                           
7 The Hausman-test suggests using fixed effect estimations. Testing the independent variables for pairwise 
correlations shows that collinearity is not a problem. 
8 A regression for the whole economy with dummies for the different industries produces similar results. 
Industry-specific fixed effect regressions allow us to draw a more detailed picture. 
 6 
 
4  Evidence for Germany 
As mentioned in the previous section, we measure the impact of a lower long-term UB on 
wages  by  using  a  dummy  variable,  which  becomes  unity  from  2005  and  on.  By  using  a 
number of appropriate control variables, the UB variable describes the pure impact of the 
structural break due to the labor market reform of 2005. Theoretically, the UB dummy covers 
all three effects of the labor market reform (flexibility, top-up benefit and lower long-term 
UB). Our methodology and dataset ensure that we measure the pure effect of the lower UB. 
The effect of the top-up benefits is excluded through dropping observations under the low 
income bound (650 euros). The effect of the increasing flexibility is covered by the industry-
specific  lay-off  risk.  Table  1  indicates  the  coefficient  of  the  UB  variable  in  the  wage 
estimation for several industries in west Germany. 
   7 
 

















  Male 
Low  -46.95***  -39.36***  -53.90***  -53.73***  -61.45***  -88.62*** 
   (-8.67)  (-21.73)  (-10.41)  (-8.77)  (-15.81)  (-6.28) 
R
2  0.0133  0.2089  0.1093  0.4114  0.0593  0.0272 
Obs.  27648  210797  39538  16341  31008  3960 
Medium  -56.69***  -54.61***  -84.12***  -75.97***  -57.38***  -133.36*** 
   (-28.6)  (-57.82)  (-42.74)  (-33.81)  (-31.00)  (-48.18) 
R
2  0.1829  0.3048  0.1837  0.1473  0.1678  0.1246 
Obs.  261912  1138386  436050  173572  190281  101814 
High  -149.79***  -131.87***  -283.34***  -134.91***  -169.44***  -198.76*** 
   (-13.17)  (-57.89)  (-38.73)  (-40.77)  (-13.80)  (-44.79) 
R
2  0.1638  0.0727  0.0733  0.0637  0.0120  0.0899 
Obs.  11955  173326  31899  91812  7543  24191 
  Female 
Low  -2.88  -31.72***  -50.06***  -77.20***  -50.22***  -49.98*** 
   (-0.10)  (-12.45)  (-8.42)  (-8.47)  (-4.32)  (-4.59) 
R
2  0.0812  0.0349  0.0374  0.2619  0.0016  0.0039 
Obs.  1383  82984  22475  7844  4395  5705 
Medium  -18.13**  -39.21***  -53.49***  -44.63***  -45.56***  -71.94*** 
   (-2.31)  (-17.11)  (-19.98)  (-14.18)  (-11.30)  (-20.99) 
R
2  0.0057  0.0369  0.0648  0.0245  0.0132  0.0529 
Obs.  22759  194598  212809  105419  43205  71788 
High  -46.93  -85.47***  -136.13***  -93.57***  -17.61  -147.09*** 
   (-0.87)  (-8.27)  (-7.58)  (-9.25)  (-0.84)  (-10.21) 
R
2  0.1482  0.0760  0.0103  0.0359  0.0662  0.0746 
Obs.  1453  16595  9541  16745  2405  6294 
Controls: Age, Professional Status, Firm-size, Firm´s Age Structure, Industrial Specific Gross Value Added per 
Worker, Lay-off Risk, Job Tenure, Quarter dummies 
Source:  authors’  calculation.  Significance-level:  0.01(***),  0.05(**)  and  0.1(*).  T-values  are  reported  in 
parentheses below the coefficients.  
In every industry for nearly all skill levels and for both genders, we find highly significant 
negative coefficients. The coefficient increases according to the number of employees with a 
higher skill level. The lowering of the outside option has a greater effect on the highly skilled, 8 
 
as evidenced in the table.
9 The negative coefficient does not imply that real wages decrease 
after the reform. The labor market reform (lower UB) has a lowering effect on wages, ceteris 
paribus. This finding is also valid for east Germany [see Table 2].   
                                                           
9 The increasing of the effect with a higher skill level is also a result of a level effect, because the wages also 
increase with a higher skill level. 9 
 

















  Male 
Low  1.25  -33.21***  16.22  -43.90***  -64.83***  -140.05*** 
   (0.07)  (-3.05)  (1.51)  (-3.04)  (-6.70)  (-3.16) 
R
2  0.0065  0.0321  0.0735  0.2326  0.0978  0.7107 
Obs.  1870  6442  2370  1364  2828  202 
Medium  -22.67***  -28.85***  -24.33***  -49.38***  -48.81***  -111.22*** 
   (-8.43)  (-13.69)  (-10.23)  (-13.96)  (-21.18)  (-11.22) 
R
2  0.0747  0.2113  0.1915  0.4083  0.1137  0.0357 
Obs.  88248  146080  77060  32682  58710  6256 
High  -45.55***  -97.53***  -55.13***  -77.92***  -79.25***  -72.28*** 
   (-2.56)  (-13.25)  (-4.44)  (-10.67)  (-5.25)  (-5.06) 
R
2  0.2161  0.0253  0.0123  0.0416  0.0276  0.0048 
Obs.  3917  19676  4402  13826  2150  2111 
  Female 
Low  10.96  -43.58***  -29.76**  -85.11***  -141.72***  -56.39* 
   (0.26)  (-3.59)  (-2.55)  (-6.05)  (-5.21)  (-1.71) 
R
2  0.3216  0.0054  0.0909  0.0075  0.0002  0.0448 
Obs.  167  4099  1549  943  719  341 
Medium  0.57  -23.09***  -20.81***  -52.24***  -40.12**  -39.27*** 
   (0.06)  (-5.92)  (-7.74)  (-13.66)  (-9.00)  (-6.15) 
R
2   0.0000  0.0609  0.1629  0.1392  0.0098  0.0019 
Obs.  7401  44711  50750  29457  18414  13072 
High  -104.99**  -81.13***  -59.83***  -8.97  -76.25**  -53.58*** 
   (-2.86)  (-6.26)  (-4.58)  (-0.78)  (-3.35)  (-3.14) 
R
2  0.0148  0.0591  0.0000  0.0884  0.0457  0.0012 
Obs.  1200  6395  3209  7215  1032  2262 
Controls: Age, Professional Status, Firm-size, Firm´s Age Structure, Industrial Specific Gross Value Added per 
Worker, Lay-off Risk, Job Tenure, Quarter-dummies 
Source:  authors’  calculation.  Significance-level:  0.01(***),  0.05(**)  and  0.1(*).  T-values  are  reported  in 
parentheses below the coefficient. 
In east Germany, the effect is smaller than in west Germany. This may be due to the lower 
average wage level in east Germany.  10 
 
Our results contribute to the literature by identifying the negative effect of a lower UB in the 
natural experiment of the 2005 labor market reform in Germany. A lower UB results in a 
decrease in wages. 
5  Conclusions 
The lower long-term UB due to the labor market reform of 2005 in Germany lowers wages, 
ceteris paribus. This does not imply that the average wage necessarily decreases, as other 
effects may superimpose on the impact of the reform. The degree of the effect depends on the 
industry, the skill level and the gender. The lower long-term UB appears to contribute to the 
weaker development for wages. Following the theory, the depressing effect of the lower UB 
on wages decreases the reservation wage because of the lower outside option. Along with 
Addison et al. (2009), we find indications for a declining reservation wage due to a lower UB 
in Germany.  
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Table 3: Regressions results for the Manufacturing Industry in West Germany 
  Low Skilled Male  Medium Skilled Male  High Skilled Male  Low Skilled Female  Medium Skilled Female  High Skilled Female 
Age  7.91***  18.52***  99.12***  10.08***  33.45***  89.69*** 
  (10.38)  (48.84)  (113.02)  (9.03)  (34.88)  (22.16) 
Worker  -262.89***  -284.00***  -308.07***  -13.73  -122.72***  -722.93*** 
  (-26.07)  (-104.58)  (-19.92)  (-1.22)  (-15.24)  (-12.13) 
Technician  -187.54***  -254.94***  -205.02***  25.61*  -86.95***  -399.65*** 
  (-17.59)  (-108.01)  (-20.14)  (1.71)  (-10.28)  (-4.81) 
Foreman  146.50***  22.50***  -8.18  607.41***  98.73***  (omitted) 
  (5.26)  (5.61)  (-0.55)  (6.19)  (3.66)   
Small Company  -67.45***  -81.69***  -74.00***  -29.17***  -64.04***  -170.33*** 
  (-18.44)  (-49.91)  (-16.79)  (-5.86)  (-16.78)  (-8.67) 
Large Company  65.33***  73.76***  46.13***  40.15***  62.64***  60.52*** 
  (23.13)  (51.10)  (14.60)  (10.86)  (18.73)  (4.39) 
Under 20  36.05  -34.69***  -302.27***  41.83  -31.95  52.37 
  (1.44)  (-3.82)  (-7.68)  (1.27)  (-1.48)  (0.30) 
Over 55  -70.83***  -172.58***  -139.17***  -215.82***  -236.85***  -147.56* 
  (-5.58)  (-29.80)  (-8.13)  (-12.27)  (-19.26)  (-1.93) 
Lay-off risk  -5333.02***  -3014.02***  18792.92***  -1626.30*  4060.32***  15393.26*** 
  (-9.48)  (-12.76)  (34.18)  (-1.77)  (5.83)  (5.48) 
Gross Value Added  -0.11  -0.23**  -7.59***  -0.88***  -2.14***  -6.47*** 
  (-0.57)  (-2.25)  (-30.84)  (-3.03)  (-8.43)  (-5.73) 
Job tenure  2.65***  4.19***  3.41***  2.40***  1.60***  0.48 
  (21.19)  (69.18)  (27.60)  (13.19)  (10.39)  (0.83) 
Lower UB  -39.36***  -54.62***  -131.87***  -31.73***  -39.22***  -85.47*** 
  (-21.73)  (-57.82)  (-57.89)  (-12.45)  (-17.11)  (-8.27) 
Constant  2461.23***  2467.41***  894.28***  1725.18***  1464.14***  943.46*** 
  (7.91)  (18.52)  (99.12)  (10.08)  (33.45)  (89.69)  
15 
 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all estimated with 
quarter dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table. 
 
Table 4: Regressions results for the Manufacturing Industry in East Germany 
  Low Skilled Male  Medium Skilled Male  High Skilled Male  Low Skilled Female  Medium Skilled Female  High Skilled Female 
Age  21.37***  9.28***  40.80***  3.01  20.08***  40.24*** 
  (3.92)  (9.21)  (11.70)  (0.50)  (10.69)  (6.46) 
Worker  -226.68***  -278.43***  -196.18***  -34.94  -118.88***  -244.43*** 
  (-5.89)  (-43.40)  (-4.75)  (-0.61)  (-9.63)  (-4.35) 
Technician  -160.65***  -256.00***  -181.06***  185.52***  -100.08***  -238.77*** 
  (-3.79)  (-46.43)  (-9.12)  (2.76)  (-8.99)  (-4.93) 
Foreman  (omitted)  46.43***  -95.79***  (omitted)  -79.66**  -42.83 
  (5.11)  (-3.78)  (-2.41)  (-0.42) 
Small Company  -20.72  -62.63***  -77.56***  -24.92  -51.65***  -32.85** 
  (-1.43)  (-24.07)  (-8.51)  (-1.51)  (-9.77)  (-1.99) 
Large Company  -17.39  91.07***  81.38***  67.37***  67.39***  78.61*** 
  (-1.07)  (30.41)  (8.46)  (2.87)  (12.22)  (4.74) 
Under 20  293.79**  78.17***  -257.63***  712.72***  -83.39***  425.21*** 
  (2.34)  (5.08)  (-3.55)  (4.48)  (-2.59)  (2.86) 
Over 55  27.12  -87.75***  -239.17***  -363.70***  -147.87***  71.48 
  (0.42)  (-9.30)  (-7.56)  (-5.00)  (-9.21)  (1.37) 
Lay-off risk  5288.26***  -2449.78***  2063.48***  3994.70**  2711.68***  3108.29* 
  (2.73)  (-12.24)  (2.63)  (2.26)  (5.10)  (1.75) 
Gross Value Added  1.92**  -0.30*  0.97*  1.72*  -0.20  0.28 
  (2.21)  (-1.82)  (1.71)  (1.82)  (-0.65)  (0.28) 
Job tenure  -3.95***  3.77***  5.18***  2.68***  0.09  3.28*** 
  (-4.60)  (31.25)  (13.76)  (3.21)  (0.38)  (4.33) 
Lower UB  -33.22***  -28.85***  -97.54***  -43.58***  -23.09***  -81.13*** 
  (-3.05)  (-13.69)  (-13.25)  (-3.59)  (-5.92)  (-6.26) 
Constant  1199.83***  1863.24***  1140.78***  1583.01***  993.26***  780.53***  
16 
 
  (21.37)  (9.28)  (40.80)  (3.01)  (20.08)  (40.24) 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all estimated with 
quarter dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table. 
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